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In-State versus Out-of-State Students: 
The Divergence of Interest between Public Universities and State Governments1 
 
Jeffrey A. Groen and Michelle J. White 
 
States have an interest in using their public universities as tools to encourage economic 
development.  University study increases students’ human capital.  Graduates with high levels of 
human capital contribute to their local economies by starting their own new businesses, attracting 
other businesses to the area, and raising wages generally.  Attending a university in a particular 
state increases graduates’ likelihood of locating in the state as adults because they develop local 
connections.  If attending university has a different effect on in-state versus out-of-state students’ 
probabilities of locating in that state, then states have an interest in favoring the particular group 
whose location decisions are most sensitive at the margin. 
However universities’ interests differ from those of their states.  Both public and private 
universities have an interest in attracting high ability students, in maximizing revenue from tuition 
and donations, and/or in having graduates who are rich and famous, but they have little interest in 
where their students come from or where they go after graduation.  Public universities in particular 
often have a financial incentive to favor out-of-state over in-state students, because out-of-state 
students pay higher tuition and universities may be able to keep the additional revenue for their 
own purposes.  Private universities have no particular interest in encouraging economic 
development in their home regions, since economic development raises wages and land prices.  
These factors suggest that there is a divergence of interest between public and private universities 
and their state governments.  Universities do not necessarily have an incentive to act in the best 
interests of their states. 
In this paper, we explore the divergence of interest between public and private universities and 
their states.  We focus on standards for admission of in-state versus out-of-state students and on 
whether universities act in their states’ interest in setting these standards.  After a brief literature 
review, section 2 develops several behavioral rules that represent states’ interest and universities’ 
interest in admitting in-state versus out-of-state students.  These rules illustrate the divergence of 
interest between universities and their state governments.  Section 3 tests the models using data 
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from College and Beyond for public and private universities.  We find that public universities set 
lower minimum admissions standards for in-state than out-of-state applicants, while private 
universities treat both groups equally.  However, we also find that favoring in-state applicants goes 
against states’ long-term financial interest.  This is because marginal out-of-state students pay 
higher tuition than marginal in-state students, have higher future earnings, and, correcting for 
selection bias, are equally influenced in whether they locate in the state after graduation by 
attending public university there.  As a result, states lose rather than gain financially when public 
universities favor in-state applicants for admission.  Finally we examine whether states would 
benefit if public universities imposed maximum as well as minimum standards for admission.2   
 
1.  Literature Review 
Goldin and Katz’s (1998) study of the growth of public higher education from 1890 to 1940 
supports the idea that state governments historically viewed public universities as tools for 
encouraging economic development.  During this period, manufacturing, mining, and agriculture 
were all becoming more specialized and science-based.  States that had substantial economic 
activity in particular fields often established specialized public universities to train workers in these 
fields and conduct research to advance the fields.  Examples include tobacco farming in North 
Carolina, dairy farming in Wisconsin, mining in Colorado, and oil exploration in Texas.  Since 
public universities provided training in fields that their states specialized in, graduates tended to 
remain in the state.  This allowed states to capture the benefits of their investments. 
College graduates create external benefits for other workers in the labor markets where they 
locate as adults, regardless of whether they work in the specific fields that the state’s economy 
specializes in.  Moretti (2002) finds that wages of both high school and college graduates are 
positively correlated with the share of college graduates in the local labor market.  Also, college 
graduates earn more than other workers and therefore pay higher state taxes.  College graduates are 
also more likely than other workers to start new businesses, which generate jobs for other workers 
and raise demand for labor (Fan and White, 2002). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
1 We are grateful to John Bound, Charles Brown, David Breneman, Paul Courant, Julie Cullen, Caroline Hoxby, Jim 
Poterba, Rohini Somanathan, and the referees for very helpful comments.  The National Science Foundation and the 
Cornell Higher Education Research Institute provided research support. 
2 For ease of exposition, we use the terms “university,” “college,” and “institution” interchangeably. 
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Since the period studied by Goldin and Katz, markets for college education and college-
educated labor have become more spatially integrated.  Hoxby (1997) argues that U.S. universities 
have been transformed from local autarkies into competitors, since students who previously 
attended universities close to home are now likely to attend universities that are further away.  This 
means that universities are increasingly forced to compete for students on regional or national 
markets.  As part of the same trend, demand for enrollment by out-of-state students has increased at 
the top public universities (Mixon and Hsing, 1994). 
The fact that college graduates from one state may locate in other states after graduation affects 
states’ incentives to invest in higher education.  Strathman (1994) and Quigley and Rubinfeld 
(1993) show empirically that states with more mobile populations spend less on public higher 
education.  Presumably these states expect to attract educated migrants from other states and/or 
expect local students to move elsewhere, so that they have less incentive to provide public 
universities to educate the local population.  There may be a rationale for Federal intervention to 
subsidize provision of public universities in states that have high migration rates. 
 
2.  Theory 
We first examine public and private universities’ interest in admitting in-state versus out-of-
state students and then turn to the state’s interest.  Our model focuses on selective universities 
because, among public universities, only those that are selective attract out-of-state applicants.  
Because the model is intended for empirical implementation, we intentionally keep it simple. 
 
2.1  The university’s interest 
The “equal cutoff rule.”  Consider first the interest of public and private universities in 
admitting in-state versus out-of-state students.  Suppose the ability level of an in-state student i is 
denoted is  and the ability level of an out-of-state student o is denoted os .  The numbers of in-state 
and out-of-state students of ability level is  and os  who apply to the university and would attend if 
accepted are denoted )( ii sn  and )( oo sn  for in-state and out-of-state students, respectively. 
Assume that universities select students by adopting minimum cutoff scores of is  and os  for in-
state and out-of-state applicants, respectively.  They reject all in-state applicants with ii ss <  and 
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accept all in-state applicants with ii ss ≥ , and similarly for out-of-state applicants.3  Universities 
have binding capacity constraints (total class size) of N .  Universities’ goal is to set the cutoff 
levels is  and os  so as to maximize students’ average ability level:   
 ∫ ∫
∞ ∞
+
i os s
ooooiiii dssnsdssnsN
])()()[1( , (1) 
subject to the capacity constraint:   
 ∫ ∫
∞ ∞
+=
i os s
oooiii dssndssnN )()( . (2) 
The first order condition is:   
 oi ss = . (3) 
We refer to this result as the “equal cutoff rule” – it says that the cutoff levels for admission of in-
state and out-of-state students should be the same.  It follows from the fact that universities are 
assumed to care only about the average ability of their students, not about where they come from.  
We test below whether public and private universities follow this rule.  If private universities are 
found to set equal cutoffs for both types of students while public universities are found to set lower 
cutoffs for in-state students, then the result will provide support for the hypothesis that states 
require or pressure public universities to favor in-state over out-of-state applicants at the margin. 
The “equal marginal revenue rule.”  Another formulation of universities’ interest assumes that 
they maximize a hybrid of average student ability and total revenue.  Suppose universities still 
admit students in declining order of ability until they reach the relevant cutoff, but they set the 
cutoff levels to maximize total revenue rather average student ability.  Suppose iT  and oT  denote 
in-state and out-of-state tuition levels, respectively.  Public universities always have higher tuition 
levels for out-of-state than in-state students, while private universities have a single tuition level for 
all students.  Both types of universities may offer tuition discounts in the form of financial aid.  
Universities also collect revenue in the form of donations from graduates.  Suppose )( ii sD  and 
)( oo sD  denote the expected present value of future donations from in-state and out-of-state students 
                                                          
3 )( ii sn  equals the number of in-state applicants of ability level is  times the proportion of  in-state applicants of ability 
level is  who would attend if accepted.  The same applies to )( oo sn .  The functions )( ii sn  and )( oo sn  are likely to 
differ because in-state applicants are more likely to attend university near their homes.  We treat these functions as 
fixed because our dataset does not contain information on the full set of applicants to particular institutions. 
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of ability levels is  and os , respectively.  Future donations are assumed to depend on student 
ability, because ability is positively related to earnings.  Assume now that universities set the cutoff 
levels is ′  and os ′  so as to maximize the sum of tuition plus donations from in-state and out-of-state 
students, or:   
 ])())(()())(([1
''
oooooo
s
iiiiii
s
dssnTsDdssnTsD
N
oi
+++ ∫∫ ∞∞ , (4) 
subject to the capacity constraint, eq. (2). 
The first order condition is:   
 oooiii TsDTsD +′=+′ )()( . (5) 
This rule – the “equal marginal revenue rule” – says that universities set the cutoff levels such that 
they collect the same amount of revenue from marginal in-state and marginal out-of-state students. 
The “equal marginal revenue rule” suggests reasons why both private and public universities 
might have an incentive to set different cutoff levels for in-state students (i.e., students who live 
nearby) versus for out-of-state (i.e., distant) students.  One reason is that in-state students are more 
likely to locate close to the university as adults and this may cause them to donate more on average 
than out-of-state students having the same ability levels.  Another reason is that universities have 
spatial monopoly power over in-state students, because some of them wish to attend college near 
their homes.  Private universities can take advantage of this monopoly power by giving less 
financial aid to nearby students, but public universities probably cannot.  (See Epple et al., 1999, 
for discussion.) 
 
2.2  The state’s interest 
The “equal additional tax payments rule.”  Now consider the interests of an arbitrary state, 
which we refer to as state X.  In line with the view that states view universities as tools of state 
economic development, we assume that state X’s goal is to maximize the present value of future 
state tax revenues.  Most states collect the bulk of their tax revenue from income and sales taxes.  
Because these taxes are roughly proportional to income, high ability individuals pay higher taxes 
because they earn more.  (High income individuals tend to pay higher amounts of other state taxes, 
such as property taxes and business taxes, as well.)  Therefore state X has an interest both in 
retaining high ability in-state students and attracting high ability out-of-state students.  Both in-state 
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and out-of-state students are assumed to choose between attending college in state X or in some 
other state.  If students attend college in state X rather than another state, we assume that their 
probability of locating in state X as adults rises, regardless of where they are from.4 
Suppose kjp  denotes students’ probabilities of locating in state X as adults.  The subscript k 
denotes home state and it equals y if the student’s home state is state X and n otherwise.  The 
subscript j denotes college state and it equals y if the student attends college in state X and n 
otherwise.  Thus yyp  is the probability of students locating in their home states as adults if they 
attend college there, ynp  is the probability of students locating in their home states as adults if they 
attend college out-of-state, and ynyyi ppp −=∆  denotes the increase in the probability of in-state 
students locating in their home states if they attend college there rather than elsewhere.  Similarly, 
nyp  is the probability of out-of-state students locating in the state where they attend college as 
adults, nnp  is the probability of students locating in a particular state as adults if they are neither 
from the state nor attend college there, and nnnyo ppp −=∆  denotes the increase in the probability 
of out-of-state students locating in a particular state if they attend college there rather than 
elsewhere.  We assume that all of these terms vary with students’ ability levels.  We further assume 
that both )( ii sp∆  and )( oo sp∆  are positive, but do not make any assumptions concerning their 
relative magnitude.  (We estimate these terms in the next section.) 
Suppose )( ii sτ  and )( oo sτ  denote the average present value of future state tax payments by in-
state graduates having ability level is  and out-of-state graduates having ability level os , 
respectively.  The present value of future state tax revenues is assumed to increase with ability for 
both types of students, but the relationship is assumed to differ for in-state versus out-of-state 
students.  The present value of future state tax revenues also varies across states because state tax 
rates differ.5 
                                                          
4 For some in-state students, the best alternative to attending the most selective public university in state X is to attend a 
less selective public university in state X, rather than a university in some other state.  In this case students’ probability 
of locating in state X as adults is likely to be unaffected by which public university in state X they attend, so that – 
according to our model – state X does not benefit when they are admitted to the most selective public university.  
Because our dataset includes only public universities that are the most selective in their states, we ignore this 
possibility. 
5 The functions )( ii sτ and  )( oo sτ  may differ because the relationship between ability and future earnings/future state 
tax payments may differ for in-state versus out-of-state students.  Note that students’ future earnings could also depend 
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The state’s goal is for the public university to set cutoff levels is~  and os~  so as to maximize the 
increase in expected future tax payments that results from in-state and out-of-state students, 
respectively, attending public university in state X rather than elsewhere, or:   
 ∫∫ ∞∞ ∆+∆
oi s
oooooooiiii
s
iii dssnsspdssnssp
~~
])()()()()()([ ττ , (6) 
subject to the same capacity constraint, eq. (2).  The first order condition is:   
 )~()~()~()~( iiiioooo sspssp ττ ∆=∆ . (7) 
Eq. (7) says that the state wants the public university to set cutoff levels such that the additional 
expected future state tax revenue collected from the marginal student admitted is the same for in-
state versus out-of-state students.  We call this the “equal additional tax payments rule.”  If the 
functions )( oo sp∆  and )( ii sp∆  are identical in the region of the cutoff levels and the functions 
)( ii sτ  and )( oo sτ  are also identical in the region of the cutoff levels, then the minimum cutoff 
levels is~  and os~  for in-state and out-of-state students should be the same.  But if )(spi∆  > )(spo∆  
and/or )( ii sτ  > )( oo sτ in the region of the cutoff levels, then the state will tend to favor a lower 
cutoff level for in-state students, and vice versa. 
The “tuition offset rule.”  States in fact receive revenue from students in two forms:  tuition 
payments from current students and future state tax payments from graduates who locate in the 
state as adults.  Therefore another formulation of the state’s objective is for public universities to 
determine the cutoff levels for in-state versus out-of-state students by maximizing the sum of 
tuition revenues plus the increase in expected future tax revenues from both types of students, 
subject to the same capacity constraint.  The first order condition implies that:   
 )~()~()~()~( ooooiiiiio sspsspTT ′′∆−′′∆=− ττ . (8) 
This is the “tuition offset rule,” which says that the extra tuition paid by marginal out-of-state 
students should just offset the extra future state tax payments paid by marginal in-state students 
admitted to the public university.  If this condition holds, then public universities are acting 
according to the state’s interest.  But if the left hand side of condition (8) is less than the right hand 
side, then it would be in the state’s interest for public universities to set a lower cutoff for in-state 
relative to out-of-state students, and vice versa.  We test this rule below. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
on the type of university they attend, but we ignore this possibility.  See Dale and Kreuger (2002) for discussion of 
whether graduates of selective universities earn more. 
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Maximum cutoffs.  So far we have assumed that it is in states’ interest for universities to admit 
students in declining order of ability and to set only minimum cutoff levels for admission of in-state 
and out-of-state students.  However states may not have lexicographical preferences for higher over 
lower ability students and may in fact prefer that universities set multiple cutoffs for one or both 
groups of students.  In particular, we investigate the possibility that states might have an interest in 
universities rejecting the highest ability applicants from in-state or out-of-state, because these 
students’ location choices are unlikely to be affected by where they attend college.  This possibility 
is of interest because state legislators often seem reluctant to support public universities at the 
expenditure levels required to attract high ability students. 
Suppose )( oo sτ  and )( ii sτ  increase monotonically with ability (since earnings are positively 
related to ability), while )( ii sp∆  and/or )( oo sp∆  may not be monotonically related to ability.  One 
possibility is that )()( iiii ssp τ∆  and )()( oooo ssp τ∆  have the shapes shown in figure 1.  Assuming 
that the “equal additional tax payments rule” is followed, the minimum cutoff levels are set at minis  
and minos , where the two curves intersect on the left hand side of the figure.  As is  increases, 
)()( iiii ssp τ∆  increases monotonically, so that states do not want their universities to set maximum 
cutoff levels for in-state students.  But as os  rises, )()( oooo ssp τ∆  rises to a maximum and then falls 
sharply.  At the point where )()( oooo ssp τ∆  < )()( minmin oooo ssp τ∆ , states want universities to set a 
maximum cutoff for out-of-state students.  If the curve for in-state students also turned downward 
at high ability levels, then states might want universities to set maximum cutoff levels for in-state 
students as well.  We test the model below. 
These arguments suggest that states may have an interest in their public universities having an 
intermediate quality level:  not too high because the highest ability students are unlikely to be 
influenced in their location decisions by whether they attend college in the state, but not too low 
because then relatively high ability in-state students would attend college elsewhere and be less 
likely to settle in the state as adults.6 
 
2.3  Summary 
                                                          
6 Our model neglects various other reasons why states may favor admitting in-state students or high ability students to 
public universities, including peer effects (Rothschild and White, 1995) or state legislators’ desire to appeal to voters 
who want their children to be admitted to the most selective public university. 
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The theory suggests several testable hypotheses.  First, if universities’ goal is to maximize 
average student ability and they are free to follow their own interests, then they are predicted to 
follow the “equal cutoff rule” or the “equal marginal revenue rule.”  Second, states prefer that 
universities follow the “equal additional tax payments rule” or the “tuition offset rule,” under which 
states gain equal additional revenue when a marginal out-of-state or in-state student is admitted to a 
public university.  Third, states may have an interest in public universities’ setting maximum as 
well as minimum cutoffs for in-state and/or out-of-state students, depending on how the highest 
ability students are influenced in their adult location decisions by attending the state university. 
In testing these hypotheses, we use data for both public and private universities.  This is 
because private universities are less likely to be influenced by their states’ preferences, so that their 
behavior follows the model of university behavior just discussed.  In contrast, public universities 
are likely to follow a path that is intermediate between their states’ preferences and private 
universities’ preferences. 
 
3.  Empirical Work  
Our primary data source is the Mellon Foundation’s College and Beyond (C&B).  This dataset 
includes information from students at 27 selective to highly selective colleges and universities who 
entered college in 1976 or 1989.  The 1976 cohort includes 32,000 students and the 1989 cohort 
includes 36,000 students.7  For both cohorts, we have information from college records.  For the 
1976 cohort, we also have information from a survey of graduates conducted in 1996 that asked 
questions concerning current state of residence and current income.  There were 23,500 responses 
to the survey. 
The C&B dataset fits our model well in that all of the institutions are selective and all enroll 
substantial numbers of both in-state and out-of-state students.  But two drawbacks of the dataset are 
that the participating universities were not randomly selected (selection in part was based on 
willingness to participate) and only four public universities – University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Miami University (Ohio); and Penn State University – 
are included.  The C&B private institutions are generally representative of selective private colleges 
                                                          
7 See Bowen and Bok (1998) for discussion of the C&B data.  For the private institutions, all students in the entering 
class were included in the dataset.  For the public universities, a sample of 2,000 students from each entering class was 
selected.  We use institutional sample weights to account for the probability of being sampled.  A list of institutions is 
in Appendix Table 1. 
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and universities and the C&B public institutions are all flagship universities that compete regionally 
and nationally with private universities for academically talented students and enroll substantial 
numbers of out-of-state students.  We address the question of whether the C&B sample is 
representative of selective colleges/universities generally by repeating some of our calculations 
using a different dataset that covers more institutions (see below). 
Table 1 shows that the average proportion of in-state students in the 1976 cohort was .83 at the 
public universities and .29 at the private universities, but in the 1989 cohort, these figures dropped 
to .76 and .23, respectively.  The increase in out-of-state students over the period reflects the 
increasing regional and national competition for students over the period. 
 
3.1  Do universities follow the “equal cutoff rule?” 
Turn first to the question of whether universities follow the “equal cutoff rule.”  We treat SAT 
scores as our measure of student ability.  Because it is impossible to identify a single student as the 
marginal in-state or out-of-state student, we treat all in-state students in the lowest decile of the in-
state distribution at each university as marginal in-state students and we follow the same procedure 
for out-of-state students.  However because athletes and minority students are heavily represented 
in the marginal group and they are likely to be admitted on different admissions criteria, we omit 
these students before constructing the sets of marginal in-state and out-of-state students.  (If 
athletes and minorities were left in, we would primarily be testing institutions’ cutoffs for these 
groups rather than for in-state versus out-of-state students.)8  For each institution, we construct the 
average SAT score for in-state and out-of-state students in the lowest decile.  We treat these values 
as the cutoffs, is  and os .  We then compute the value of )( io ss −  for each institution and we report 
)( io ss −  averaged over the groups of public and private universities. 
The results are given in the middle panel of table 1.  For the 1976 cohort at public universities, 
the average value of )( io ss −  is 51 points and the minimum and maximum values are 8 and 77, 
respectively.  The value of )( io ss −  is significantly different from zero for three of the four 
institutions, using a one-tailed test.  Thus our data suggest that public universities set higher 
                                                          
8 Since no information was available concerning athletic scholarships, we defined athletes as anyone who played an 
intercollegiate sport during college.  Minorities include African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans.  For 
public university students in the 1976 cohort, 40% of in-state students and 53% of out-of-state students in the lowest 
decile were athletes or minorities.  For private university students in the same cohort, the figures were 55% and 47%, 
respectively.  For the 1989 cohort, the figures were 44%, 58%, 69%, and 57%, respectively. 
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minimum cutoff levels for out-of-state students.  Now turn to private universities.  The average 
value of )( io ss −  is 10 points, with a minimum of -122 and a maximum of 81.  Thus, on average, 
private universities treat in-state and out-of-state students equally, but there is a wide range of 
behavior.  To gauge the importance of the admissions advantage given to in-state students, we 
calculate the share of the overall student distribution that is between the two cutoffs.  For 1976, this 
figure is 5 percent at public universities, compared to less than 1 percent at private universities.  
Thus the in-state advantage at public universities is significant but not large, while in-state and out-
of-state students are treated equally at private universities.9 
We repeat the analysis using the 1989 cohort and the results are shown on the right-hand side of 
table 1.  The results show that public universities gave in-state students a larger advantage in 1989 
than in 1976 – 84 points versus 51, while private universities’ behavior again treated both groups of 
students equally, but with wide variation in their behavior.  Overall the results suggest that public 
universities consistently favor in-state students by a small margin, while private universities on 
average treat in-state and out-of-state students the same.10 
In order to check on the representativeness of the C&B sample, we would like to replicate the 
analysis of the “equal cutoff rule” with a dataset that contains more institutions.  However we 
found only one dataset that both contains more institutions and also has a large sample of students 
at each institution.  The Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) at UCLA annually surveys 
college freshmen at a nationally representative sample of 4-year colleges and universities.  
Unfortunately HERI only began to collect data on students’ state of residence starting in 2001, so 
that our replication is for a later time period. 
We constructed two samples of institutions from the HERI data.  The first includes 10 public 
and 39 private institutions that are as selective as those in the C&B dataset.  The second adds 5 
additional public and 46 additional private institutions, all taken from the next-most-selective 
category.  All institutions in both samples have at least 10% out-of-state students.11  We followed 
                                                          
9 For the private institutions in 1976, the value of )( io ss −  is significantly different from zero for only 6 of 22 
institutions, using a two-tailed test. 
10 The value of )( io ss −  is significantly different from zero for all of the four public institutions in 1989, using a one-
tailed test.  We also repeated the analysis using the lowest 20% of SAT scores, rather than the lowest 10%, and the 
results were similar. 
11 All private institutions had at least an 85% participation rate by students in the HERI survey and all public 
institutions had a 75% participation rate.  Institutions were also required to have data on students’ home states and 
SAT/ACT scores for at least 75% of their students.  There are 47,863 and 90,208 students in the two samples.  See Sax 
et al. (2001) for a discussion of the HERI survey. 
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the same procedure as above to calculate average values of )( io ss − .  The bottom panel of table 1 
gives the results.  Examine the more selective sample first.  For the public universities, the average 
value of )( io ss −  is 49 points and the share of the overall distribution between the two cutoffs is 4 
percent.  For the 39 private institutions, the average value of )( io ss −  is 33 points, but the range is 
large.  The average share of the overall distribution between the cutoffs is 2 percent.  Thus the 
results are similar to those using the C&B, even though the time period is later.  Now examine the 
results for the less selective sample.  Both public and private institutions on average give a smaller 
preference to in-state students.  For publics, the share of the overall distribution between the two 
cutoffs is only 3 percent, while for the privates, it is 1 percent.  These results again suggest that 
selective public universities give in-state students a small advantage in admission, while private 
universities tend to treat students equally. 
 
3.2  Do universities follow the “equal marginal revenue rule”? 
In the theoretical discussion, we argued that universities follow the “equal marginal revenue 
rule,” i.e., they set minimum cutoffs such that revenue from tuition plus donations is the same for 
marginal in-state versus marginal out-of-state students, or oooiii TsDTsD +′=+′ )()( .  The C&B 
dataset includes information concerning donations, but only for graduates of private institutions.  It 
does not include information concerning individual student tuition levels (financial aid).  We 
therefore ignore differences in tuition levels across in-state versus out-of-state students – which in 
any case are likely to be small for students at private institutions.  The “equal marginal revenue 
rule” then simplifies to a rule of equal donations by marginal in-state versus out-of-state students, 
or )()( ooii sDsD ′=′ .  Although we only have data for graduates of private universities, we analyze 
them on the grounds that the results are also suggestive for public universities’ behavior, assuming 
that donations behavior by public versus private university graduates is similar.  (Actually, most 
public universities did not regularly solicit donations from graduates as of the mid-1990’s, but they 
appear to be moving in that direction.) 
We have data on donations between 1991 and 1996 by graduates in the 1976 cohort.  The data 
cover 18 of the private institutions in our dataset and are taken from the institutions’ records.  To 
determine ))()(( iioo sDsD ′−′  for each institution, we constructed distributions of donations by the 
marginal groups of in-state and out-of-state students at each institution (again excluding athletes 
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and minorities).  We focus on the 75th percentile value in each distribution, because average 
donations are heavily affected by large gifts and the median donation is usually zero.  We found the 
difference between the 75th percentile donation by marginal out-of-state versus marginal in-state 
students at each of the 18 institutions and then calculated the average value.  The results are that the 
average value of ))()(( iioo sDsD ′−′  is $17 per year and the range is from -$58 to $117 per year.  
Out-of-state students give more than in-state students at 14 of the 18 institutions and the average 
difference in donations is $17 per year.  But the difference in donations is significantly different 
from zero at only one of the 14 institutions.  Thus the results do not support the idea that 
universities give in-state students an advantage in admissions because they donate more.  On the 
contrary, they suggest that private institutions, at least, have an interest in treating in-state and out-
of-state students equally.12 
 
3.3  The effect of attending college in a state on adult location choice 
In order to test the “equal additional tax payments rule,” we must estimate the increase in 
marginal in-state versus out-of-state students’ probabilities of locating in a particular state as adults 
when they attend college there.  These effects are denoted )( ii sp∆ and )( oo sp∆  for marginal in-
state and out-of-state students, respectively.  Our sample consists of students in the 1976 cohort 
who responded to the 1996 survey, so that we observe students’ locations 16 years after graduation 
from college.  We drop students who are from outside the U.S. or lived outside the U.S. at the time 
of the survey.  Also for reasons discussed below, we drop students if they did not answer survey 
questions that asked which universities they applied to. 
We use a conditional logit model.  Because students can locate in any of the 50 states plus the 
District of Columbia, students each choose their state of residence from among 51 alternatives.13  
The dependent variable equals one for the state where the student lived at the time of the survey 
and zero for all other states.  Pre-college and college locations are represented by three dummy 
variables:  home equals one for the student’s home state and zero otherwise, college equals one for 
the state in which the student attended college and zero otherwise, and home×college is an 
                                                          
12 The same result also emerges if we examine donation behavior only by students who donate positive amounts or if 
we run a regression explaining donations as a function of in-state versus out-of-state status, SAT score, and income at 
the time of the survey.  The average donation in the marginal group of students is $66/year. 
13 The conditional logit model is intended for situations in which individuals choose from among more than two 
mutually exclusive categories.  See Greene (2000, Section 19.7). 
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interaction between the home and college variables.14  The omitted category is states that are 
neither the student’s home state nor his/her college state.  We represent students’ ability level with 
three dummy variables:  low SAT equals one if the student is in the lowest quintile of the SAT 
distribution for in-state or out-of-state students (whichever is relevant), middle SAT equals one if 
the student is in any of the three middle quintiles, and high SAT equals one if the student is in the 
highest quintile.  Also we define a dummy variable for whether students attended public versus 
private universities.  In order to estimate )( ii sp∆  and )( oo sp∆  for the marginal groups of students 
at public and private universities, we interact the three location variables with three SAT variables 
and interact the resulting variables with the public versus private variable.  We also include state 
fixed effects.15 
The results of the regression are given in Appendix table 2.  The results are used to predict yyp , 
ynp , ip∆ , nyp , nnp , and op∆  for in-state versus out-of-state students in the lowest quintile of the 
SAT distribution at public and private universities.  The results are shown in table 2, columns (1) 
and (2).  Because state fixed effects are included in the regression, the estimates differ across states 
and we show the results for a representative state.16  The probability of marginal in-state students 
locating in their home states as adults if they attend college there ( yyp ) is .55 for public university 
students and .51 for private university students.  These figures suggest that home state is an 
important factor in determining graduates’ post-college location choices.  If students instead attend 
college outside their home states, the probability of locating in their home states after college ( ynp ) 
falls to .32 for both public and private university students.17  Thus the increase in the probability of 
in-state students locating in their home states if they attend college there is )( ii sp∆  = .55 - .32 = 
.23 for public university students, compared to .19 for private university students.  For marginal 
out-of-state students, the probabilities of locating in the state where they attend college ( nyp ) are 
                                                          
14 Students’ home states are the states where the high schools from which they graduated are located. 
15 We use the lowest quintile rather than the lowest decile of the relevant distributions as our marginal groups, because 
some of the data come from the post-college survey, which has fewer observations than the college records used in the 
previous section.  State fixed effects are included to capture relative sizes of states, climate, and other factors that vary 
across states but not across individuals. 
16 We do not identify the representative state, because the confidentiality rules for the C&B dataset preclude reporting 
results for particular institutions and most states contain only one institution. 
17 This figure is calculated assuming that students from a particular state who attend an out-of-state institution rather 
than an in-state public university may attend either a public or a private institution.  We make this assumption because 
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.15 and .07 if they attend public or private universities, respectively, and the probability of locating 
in a particular state if they are neither from the state nor attended college there ( nnp ) is .01 for both 
types of universities.  Thus the increase in the probability that marginal out-of-state students locate 
in a particular state if they attend college there ( )( oo sp∆ ) is .14 for public university students and 
.06 for private university students. 
An implication of these results is that attending a public university has a much larger effect on 
students’ post-college location choices than attending a private university.  This may be because, 
when students attend public universities, they meet many more in-state students than they would if 
they attended a private university in the same state.  But another possibility, which we now 
consider, is that there may be selection bias arising from students’ choice of where to attend 
college.  In particular, whether students attend college in a particular state may be correlated with 
whether they would like to live in that state after graduation. 
For example, students from Ohio who want to remain close to their families are likely both to 
attend college in Ohio and to locate in Ohio after graduation.  But students from Ohio who want to 
live in warm climates are likely both to attend college in Arizona and to locate in Arizona (or 
another warm state) after graduation.  Ignoring this factor causes our estimates to overstate the 
effect of going to college in a state on the probability of locating in that state after graduation.  Our 
estimate of yyp  is based on natives of a representative state who attend college in their home state.  
This group, on average, is predisposed to their home state as a post-college location.  But our 
estimate of ynp  is based on natives of the same state who go to college outside their home state and 
therefore tend to be predisposed against their home state as a post-college location.  These effects 
cause our estimates of yyp  to be biased upward and ynp  to be biased downward, so that our 
estimate of ip∆  is biased upward.  Similarly, our estimate of nyp  is based on non-natives of the 
representative state who attend college in the state and are predisposed to the state as a post-college 
location; while our estimate of nnp  is based on non-natives of the state who don’t attend college 
there and are pre-disposed against locating there.  These effects cause our estimate of op∆  to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
the number of students in our sample who attended an out-of-state public university is fairly small.  As a result, the 
value of ynp  is the same for both public and private universities.  A similar point applies to the calculations of nnp . 
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biased upward.  In both cases, the treatment group is composed of students who are predisposed to 
the state and the control group is composed of students who are predisposed against the state. 
To address this problem, we use information concerning the set of institutions that students 
applied to but did not attend.  We have information on up to four such institutions.  Since location 
preferences are a factor in college choice, students reveal information about their location 
preferences by the locations of the colleges they apply to.  We re-estimate the model of adult 
location choice but with two changes.  First, we restrict the sample to students who applied to 
colleges in more than one state, since this group of students does not have strong preferences to 
locate in a particular state.  Second, we define a new dummy variable apply that equals one if a 
student applied to at least one institution in a state and zero otherwise.  We interact apply with all of 
the variables involving home and we also introduce a new set of variables that interact apply with 
the dummy variables for the low, middle, and high SAT score regions and with the dummy variable 
for public versus private institution.  Adding the latter group of variables allows us to use the 
information concerning students’ applications to colleges in states other than their home or college 
states, where these states are the omitted category for the home and college variables.18 
The results of the model are given in Appendix table 3.  We use them to re-do our predictions 
of yyp , ynp , etc., for marginal students at public and private institutions, using the same 
representative state as before.  The results are shown are in columns (3) and (4) of table 2.  
Comparing the adjusted and unadjusted results for public university students, we find that yyp  falls 
from .55 to .45 and ynp  rises from .32 to .34.  Both of these changes are in the predicted direction.  
This causes our estimate of )( ii sp∆  for marginal in-state public university students to fall from .23 
to .11.  Similarly nyp  falls from .15 to .14 and nnp  rises from .01 to .04, so that )( oo sp∆  for 
marginal out-of-state public university students falls from .14 to .10.  For private universities, the 
changes are similar:  )( ii sp∆  falls from .19 to .08 and )( oo sp∆  falls from .06 to .02.  Thus 
adjusting for bias in the estimation of )( ii sp∆ and )( oo sp∆  sharply reduces the predicted effect of 
attending college in a state on the probability of graduates’ locating in that state.  For in-state 
students, the adjusted results show that attending a public university has only a slightly larger effect 
                                                          
18 40% of marginal in-state students and 80% of marginal out-of-state students applied to colleges in more than one 
state.  There are no interactions between college and apply, since students must have applied to a college in the state 
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on post-college location choice than attending a private university does, although the difference 
remains large for out-of-state students.  But the most surprising result of the adjustments is that 
attending a public university has nearly the same effect on whether marginal in-state versus out-of-
state students locate in the state after graduation (.11 versus .10).  This differs from the unadjusted 
results, where the in-state student effect was considerably larger. 
 
3.4  Do universities follow the “equal additional tax payments rule?” 
Now consider the “equal additional tax payments rule,” eq. (7).  This says that states would like 
public and private universities within their boundaries to set cutoff levels such that the increase in 
expected future state tax payments when a marginal student is admitted is the same for students 
from in-state versus out-of-state.  This requires that the difference between expected additional 
state tax payments from marginal in-state versus out-of-state students, 
)()()()( ooooiiii sspssp ττ ∆−∆ , equals zero.  We refer to this term as Difference. 
We estimated )( ii sp∆  and )( oo sp∆  in the previous section.  Now turn to expected future state 
tax payments by marginal students, )( ii sτ  and )( oo sτ .  Our only observation of graduates’ incomes 
comes from their answers to the 1996 survey, which asked about income during the previous year.  
However, graduates earn income and pay taxes to the state every year.  We therefore convert 
reported income in 1995 for each graduate in the sample into an estimate of lifetime income, 
expressed in 1995 dollars.  We use age-earnings data for college graduates from Murphy and 
Welch (1990) and standard mortality tables.19  We estimate that lifetime income is 38 times the 
value of income in 1995.  We then convert graduates’ lifetime incomes into lifetime state tax 
payments by multiplying lifetime incomes by the sum of the income and sales tax rates in 1995 in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
where they attended college.  See Groen (2003) for further discussion of the specification and estimation results using a 
different dataset.  The results are similar to those reported here. 
19 Murphy and Welch (1990, table 9) report that earnings of college graduates increase by 74.3% during the first 10 
years of labor market experience, increase by 29.3% during the next 15 years of experience, and decline by 9.8% 
during the next 15 years of experience.  Our figure for earned income is assumed to be for the 16th year of labor market 
experience.  We discount income over 10-year age ranges by the probability of death in that range, using mortality data 
for 1998 from Murphy (2000), table 23, p. 80.  We do not apply a discount rate, since the figures for earnings growth 
are in real terms.  The resulting figures underestimate true lifetime state tax payments because they neglect earnings 
from wealth and pensions, but they overestimate true lifetime state tax payments by assuming that all graduates work 
for 40 years and that all income is subject to taxes. 
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the state where the graduate attended college.  For all of the states represented in our sample, the 
average combined tax rate is 9.8 percent.20 
We then compute average lifetime state tax payments for in-state and out-of-state students in 
the lowest quintile of the relevant distribution for each institution in our sample.  These are denoted 
)( ii sτ  and )( oo sτ , respectively.  Because our estimates of average income are affected by students’ 
location preferences, we compute )( ii sτ  and )( oo sτ  both with and without adjustments for location 
preferences.  The unadjusted values of )( ii sτ  and )( oo sτ  are based on all students in the relevant 
marginal group, while the adjusted values of )( ii sτ  and )( oo sτ  are based on students in the 
marginal group who applied to colleges in more than one state.21 
The middle rows of table 3 report the results for )( ii sτ  and )( oo sτ , averaged over the groups of 
public versus private universities.  The unadjusted estimates are shown in the left panel.  At public 
universities, lifetime state tax payments by marginal out-of-state students are 25 percent higher than 
those by marginal in-state students ($225,000 versus $177,000, respectively).  This difference could 
be due to strong location preferences by in-state students, who may pass up lucrative opportunities 
in order to remain near home.  In addition, the difference could be explained by the lower average 
ability of marginal in-state students at public universities, since these students were subject to a 
lower minimum cutoff level for admission.  Marginal private university students have higher 
lifetime state tax payments than marginal public university students, regardless of whether they are 
from in-state or out-of-state.  This could reflect weaker preferences to remain near home or higher 
minimum cutoffs at private universities, or both.  When the results are adjusted, as shown on the 
right side of table 3, the differential between out-of-state versus in-state students at public 
universities falls ($227,000 versus $185,000, respectively).  But at private universities, the ranking 
is reversed and in-state students’ average tax payments are higher than those of out-of-state 
students ($273,000 versus $264,000, respectively).  Since we have adjusted for location 
preferences, the remaining differential probably reflects differences in average ability levels 
between out-of-state and in-state students. 
Now turn to the value of Difference for the marginal group of students. The average unadjusted 
value for public universities is $9,400 and the range for the various institutions in our sample is 
                                                          
20 See Council of State Governments (1996), tables 6.21 and 6.23.  Tax rates are as of January 1, 1996.  Note that most 
states’ income taxes are approximately constant rather than strongly progressive. 
21 We again use the lowest 20% of in-state and out-of-state students (by SAT score) at each institution. 
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from $3,600 to $16,800.  This reflects the balance of two opposing effects:  in-state students earn 
less and therefore pay lower state taxes than out-of-state students, but the effect of attending 
university in the state on their adult location choices is higher.  Since Difference is positive, the 
latter effect more than offsets the former.  But with adjusted figures, the picture changes.  The 
average adjusted value of Difference for public universities is -$2,000, because in-state students 
earn less than out-of-state students and the “pull” of attending university in the state is about the 
same.  The implication is that, as of 1976, states would have benefited financially if public 
universities had reduced the advantage they gave to marginal in-state students and accepted more 
marginal out-of-state students. 
For private universities, the results are different.  The unadjusted average value of Difference 
for private universities is $32,600 and the adjusted figure is $17,400.  Therefore state governments 
would collect more tax revenues if private universities had used lower minimum cutoff levels for 
in-state students in 1976. 
 
3.5  Test of the “tuition offset rule” 
Now consider the “tuition offset rule,” eq. (8).  Under this rule, the present value of extra state 
tax payments collected from a marginal in-state student rather than a marginal out-of-state student 
(Difference) should just offset the tuition differential between out-of-state and in-state students at 
public universities.  To evaluate this rule, we need information for 1976 on the tuition differential 
between out-of-state and in-state students ( io TT − ) at each of the four public universities in the 
C&B.  We multiply the tuition differential by four years of college and then convert the result to 
1995 dollars using the consumer price index. We adjust the tuition differential to take account of 
the fact that it is collected 16 to 19 years earlier than the date for which we calculate Difference, 
which is 1995, using a real discount rate of .02 per year.  The resulting average tuition differential 
is $25,600. 
The results in table 3 show that a marginal in-state student at a public university generates 
either $9,400 more in lifetime state tax payments or $2,000 less, depending on whether the adjusted 
or unadjusted figures are used.  Combining these figures with the $25,600 in-state tuition 
differential, we find that states lose each time their public universities substitute a marginal in-state 
student for a marginal out-of-state student:  the per student expected loss is -$16,200 or -$27,700, 
depending on whether the adjusted or unadjusted figures are used.  Our results suggest that states 
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would have gained substantially if public universities had not favored in-state students as strongly 
as they did in 1976. 
 
3.6  Do states have an interest in setting maximum as well as minimum cutoffs? 
Now turn to whether states would gain if universities set maximum as well as minimum cutoff 
levels for in-state or out-of-state students.  To investigate this issue, we calculate Difference 
separately for all three ability regions of the SAT distribution:  the lowest quintile, the three middle 
quintiles, and the highest quintile.  Instead of calculating Difference for each institution and then 
summarizing across groups of institutions (our procedure in the previous sections), we instead pool 
the individual-level data across institutions, keeping public versus private university students 
separate.  For each group, we calculate average lifetime state tax payment.22  This procedure abstracts 
from the characteristics of existing institutions because we wish to address the general question of 
whether states gain when high ability students attend public or private universities within their 
borders.  We use the same procedure to adjust for location preference as above. 
Table 4 gives the results.  For in-state students at public universities, the probabilities of 
locating in the home state after graduation ( yyp ) are .45, .42, and .39 for the lowest, middle, and 
highest ability groups, respectively.  For out-of-state students, the probabilities of locating in the 
home state ( ynp ) are .34, .28, and .19 for the three groups, respectively.  Thus home state becomes 
a smaller influence on adult location choice as ability increases, both for in-state and out-of-state 
students.  This is probably because higher ability students have better opportunities generally than 
lower ability students, so that their best opportunities are more likely to involve leaving their home 
states.  But a surprising result is that, because ynp  falls faster than yyp , )( ii sp∆  rises as ability 
increases:  the figures are .11, .13, and .20 for the low, middle, and high ability groups, 
respectively.23  For in-state private university students, the highest value of )( ii sp∆  is again the 
value for high ability students:  the figures are .08, .06, and .09 for the low, middle and high ability 
groups, respectively.  Thus high ability students are more influenced in their adult location choices 
by attending college in their home states than are middle or low ability students, regardless of 
whether they attend public or private universities. 
                                                          
22 In the calculations, we use only students who applied to colleges in more than one state.  The SAT score ranges for 
the three groups of students are:  400-1040, 1040-1330, and 1330-1600. 
23 The difference between the figures for the low versus high ability groups is statistically significant (see table 4). 
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Now consider out-of-state students.  For public universities, nyp  and nnp  are not monotonically 
related to ability and therefore )( oo sp∆  does not have a consistent pattern:  it is .10, .09, and .11 for 
the low, middle, and high ability groups, respectively.  At private universities, )( oo sp∆  is lower 
and again does not have a monotonic relationship with ability:  it is .02, .04, and .03 for the low, 
middle, and high ability groups, respectively.  Thus there is little relationship between ability and 
how out-of-state students’ location choices are influenced by where they attend college.  The only 
strong pattern for out-of-state students is that their adult location choices are more strongly 
influenced by where they attend college if they attend a public rather than private institution. 
Now turn to the lifetime state tax payment figures in table 4.  As expected, they increase 
monotonically with ability for all types of students.  For example, in-state public university students 
have lifetime state tax payments of $205,000, $237,000, and $292,000 in the lowest, middle, and 
highest SAT categories, respectively.  The increases are similar for other groups of students.  Also 
within ability levels, out-of-state students have higher lifetime state tax payments than in-state 
students at public universities, but the pattern is reversed at private universities.  (However, the 
differences are usually not statistically significant.) 
The figures for Difference, )()()()( ooooiiii sspssp ττ ∆−∆ , are given at the bottom of table 4.  
Because both the “pull” of attending college in a particular state and lifetime state tax payments 
increase with ability, Difference also increases with ability.  For public university students, the 
figures are -$700, $5,100, and $22,900 for the lowest, middle, and highest ability groups, 
respectively, and for private university students, they are $16,800, $8,000, and $20,600.  Because 
Difference is negative only for low ability public university students, the results suggest that states 
lose financially when public universities admit additional in-state students from the lowest ability 
group and gain financially when they admit additional in-state students from either the middle or 
the highest ability groups. 
Putting these results together, they suggest the following:  (1)  States would gain financially if 
public universities reduced the extent to which they favor in-state over out-of-state students at the 
low ability margin.  (2)  States would also gain financially if public universities attracted more high 
ability students, both from in-state and out-of-state.  This is because high ability students tend to be 
more influenced in their adult location decisions by where they attend college than are middle or 
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low ability in-state students and they also pay the highest state taxes.  This suggests a rationale for 
public support of at least one flagship public university that has high academic quality and is likely 
to attract high ability students from both in-state and out-of-state.  (3)  States also have a large 
financial gain when private universities within their boundaries attract high ability in-state students, 
although the gain is lower when private universities attract high ability out-of-state students.  This 
suggests a rationale for states to subsidize scholarships for high-ability in-state students at private 
universities within their boundaries.  (4)  Finally, our data do not support the idea of imposing 
maximum cutoff levels at public universities for either in-state or out-of-state students.  This is 
because states gain more financially when an additional high ability student is admitted than when 
an additional low ability student from in-state is admitted, regardless of whether the high ability 
student is from in-state or out-of-state. 
 
4.  Conclusions  
In this paper, we examine the divergence of interest between universities and state governments 
concerning standards for admitting in-state versus out-of-state students.  States have an interest in 
using universities to attract and retain high ability individuals because they pay higher state taxes 
and contribute more to economic development.  In contrast, universities have an interest in their 
graduates being successful, but little interest in where their students come from or where they go 
after graduation.  We show that universities have an incentive to set equal admissions cutoffs for 
marginal in-state versus out-of-state students.  In contrast, states may gain when universities set 
lower minimum admissions cutoffs for in-state than out-of-state students, if in-state students’ future 
location choices are more affected by attending public university than are out-of-state students’. 
We test the predictions of the model for both public and private universities, using the Mellon 
Foundation’s College & Beyond dataset.  Because the C&B dataset covers only a limited number of 
universities that were not randomly selected, our results are more tentative than they would be with 
a larger and more representative set of institutions. 
We find that when athletes and minorities are omitted from the analysis, public universities 
consistently set lower minimum admissions cutoffs for in-state than out-of-state students.  The 
proportion of students who are between the in-state and out-of-state minimum cutoffs is 5 to 8 
percent.  Private universities, in contrast, treat in-state and out-of-state applicants equally.  
Surprisingly, we find that states gain more in expected future state tax revenues when marginal out-
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of-state students are admitted to public universities than when marginal in-state students are 
admitted.  Thus when states pressure their public universities to set lower cutoffs for in-state than 
out-of-state applicants, they are acting against their own financial interest. 
We also investigate whether states would gain if public universities set maximum as well as 
minimum cutoffs for admission of in-state or out-of-state students, i.e., if they discouraged high 
ability students from attending.  We find that as ability increases, students are more rather than less 
influenced in their location decisions by where they attend college, regardless of whether they are 
from in-state or out-of-state.  And because higher ability students pay higher state taxes, states 
benefit when higher ability students from both in-state and out-of-state attend public universities.  
Thus states would not benefit from public universities setting maximum cutoffs for admission.  On 
the contrary, they gain from having a flagship university that attracts high ability students from 
both in-state and out-of-state. 
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Figure 1: 
Student Ability and Future State Tax Payments by  
In-State vs. Out-of-State Students: 
An Example 
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Table 1: 
Tests of the Equal Cutoff Rule  
Using the Lowest Decile of Students 
 
All students 
 
 
1976 cohort 1989 cohort 
 Public Private Public Private 
Number of institutions 4 23 4 23 
Proportion in-state .83 .29 .76 .23 
 
Non-athletes and non-minorities 
)( io ss −  (mean) 51 10  84 36 
)( io ss −  (min, max) 8, 77 -122, 81 33, 117 -66, 137 
Share between  
is  and os  (mean) 
.05 .00 .08 .01 
 
Results using HERI data (2001 cohort) 
 More selective sample Less selective sample 
)( io ss −  (mean) 49 33  38 23 
)( io ss −  (min, max) 12, 98 -46, 128 -15, 98 -89, 128 
Share between  
is  and os  (mean) 
.04 .02 .03 .01 
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Table 2: 
Effect of Attending College in a State on the Probability of Locating in the State after College 
Students in the Lowest SAT Quintile 
 
 Not adjusted for selection bias:  Adjusted for selection bias: 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Public Private  Public Private 
)( ii sp∆  0.226 (0.005) 0.189 (0.007) )( ii sp∆  0.114 (0.008) 0.082 (0.011) 
yyp  0.55 0.51 yyp  0.45 0.42 
ynp  0.32 0.32 ynp  0.34 0.34 
)( oo sp∆  0.136 (0.011) 0.057 (0.003) )( oo sp∆  0.102 (0.011) 0.019 (0.002) 
nyp  0.15 0.07 nyp  0.14 0.06 
nnp  0.01 0.01 nnp  0.04 0.04 
  
Notes: yyp  is the probability of students locating in their home states as adults if they attend college there, ynp  is the 
probability of students locating in their home states as adults if they attend college out-of-state, and ynyyi ppp −=∆  is 
the increase in the probability of in-state students locating in their home states if they attend college there rather than 
elsewhere.  nyp , nnp , and op∆  are analogously defined for students who attend college out-of-state.  All values are for 
students in the lowest quintile of SAT scores and are for a representative state.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3: 
Tests of the “Equal Additional Tax Payments Rule” 
 
 Unadjusted  Adjusted 
 Public Private Public Private 
)( ii sp∆  0.226 0.189 0.114 0.082 
)( oo sp∆  0.136 0.057 0.102 0.019 
     
)( ii sτ  (mean) $177,100 $254,500 $185,300 $273,300 
)( oo sτ (mean) $225,400 $272,300 $227,100 $264,400 
     
Difference (mean) $9,400 $32,600 -$2,000 $17,400 
Difference (min, max) $3,600, $16,800 $11,000, $59,000 -$8,600, $4,900 $6,100, $39,000 
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Table 4: 
Do States Gain When High and Middle Ability Students  
Attend College in the State? 
 
 Public Private 
SAT category Low Middle  High Low  Middle High 
yyp  .45 .42 .39 .42 .34 .28 
ynp  .34 .28 .19 .34 .28 .19 
)( ii sp∆   .114 (.008) .131 (.009) .198 (.022) .082 (.011) .060 (.011) .091 (.005) 
       
nyp  .14 .13 .15 .06 .07 .07 
nnp  .04 .03 .04 .04 .03 .04 
)( oo sp∆   .102 (.011) .094 (.006) .114 (.023) .019 (.002) .037 (.003) .034 (.001) 
       
)( ii sτ  $205,100 
(9,000) 
$236,700 
(8,000) 
$291,900 
(22,900) 
$262,100 
(17,800) 
$309,600 
(8,700) 
$347,900 
(14,000) 
)( oo sτ  $236,600 
(16,900) 
$275,600 
(13,000) 
$305,900 
(29,100) 
$248,800 
(8,500) 
$286,500 
(3,800) 
$326,400 
(6,300) 
       
)()( iiii ssp τ∆  $23,400 $31,000 $57,800 $21,500 $19,000 $31,700 
)()( oooo ssp τ∆  $24,100 $25,900 $34,900 $4,700 $10,600 $11,100 
       
Difference -$700 $5,100 $22,900 $16,800 $8,000 $20,600 
 
Notes: All figures are adjusted for location preferences.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix Table 1: 
Institutions in the College and Beyond Dataset Used in Our Study 
 
Public Institutions 
 
Miami University (Ohio) 
University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) 
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) 
Pennsylvania State University 
 
Private Institutions 
 
Universities 
 
Colleges 
Columbia University 
Duke University 
Emory University 
Georgetown University 
Northwestern University 
University of Notre Dame 
University of Pennsylvania 
Princeton University 
Rice University 
Stanford University 
Tufts University 
Tulane University 
Vanderbilt University 
Washington University 
Yale University 
Barnard College  
Bryn Mawr College  
Denison University 
Hamilton College 
Kenyon College 
Oberlin College 
Smith College  
Swarthmore College 
Wellesley College 
Wesleyan College 
Williams College 
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Appendix Table 2: 
Conditional Logit Model Estimates 
Without Controls for Initial Location Preferences 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
home 2.804 0.029
home × {SAT low} × public -0.067 0.151
home × {SAT low} × private 0.338 0.068
home × {SAT middle} × public -0.119 0.110
home × {SAT high} × public -0.617 0.251
home × {SAT high} × private -0.399 0.055
   
college 1.630 0.044
college × {SAT low} × public 0.701 0.191
college × {SAT low} × private 0.024 0.116
college × {SAT middle} × public 0.532 0.150
college × {SAT high} × public 0.455 0.301
college × {SAT high} × private -0.159 0.078
   
home × college  -1.185 0.071
home × college × {SAT low} × public 0.001 0.281
home × college × {SAT low} × private 0.124 0.178
home × college × {SAT middle} × public 0.010 0.214
home × college × {SAT high} × public 0.329 0.449
home × college × {SAT high} × private 0.244 0.136
 
State fixed effects Yes
 
Log-Likelihood -48,999
Pseudo R2 0.3480
 
Notes: home is an indicator for students being from the state and college is an indicator for students attending college in 
the state.  {SAT low}, {SAT middle}, and {SAT high} indicate SAT scores in the lowest quintile, the middle three 
quintiles, and the highest quintile, respectively, of the distribution of SAT scores.  {public} and {private} indicate that 
the student attended a public or private university/college.  The sample size is 19,113. 
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Appendix Table 3: 
Conditional Logit Model Estimates 
With Controls for Initial Location Preferences 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
home  2.723 0.035 
home × apply × {SAT low} × public -1.166 0.266 
home × apply × {SAT low} × private -0.476 0.139 
home × apply × {SAT middle} × public -0.988 0.188 
home × apply × {SAT middle} × private -0.671 0.072 
home × apply × {SAT high} × public -1.857 0.478 
home × apply × {SAT high} × private -1.149 0.103 
   
college 0.954 0.245 
college × {SAT low} × private -0.470 0.291 
college × {SAT middle} × public 0.141 0.307 
college × {SAT middle} × private -0.189 0.253 
college × {SAT high} × public 0.327 0.464 
college × {SAT high} × private -0.309 0.262 
   
home × college  -0.375 0.378 
home × college × {SAT low} × private 0.074 0.443 
home × college × {SAT middle} × public -0.198 0.467 
home × college × {SAT middle} × private -0.192 0.391 
home × college × {SAT high} × public 0.654 0.744 
home × college × {SAT high} × private 0.109 0.409 
   
apply 1.526 0.150 
apply × {SAT low} × private -0.443 0.183 
apply × {SAT middle} × public -0.276 0.189 
apply × {SAT middle} × private -0.571 0.157 
apply × {SAT high} × public -0.596 0.285 
apply × {SAT high} × private -0.550 0.165 
  
State fixed effects Yes  
  
Log-Likelihood -34,087  
Pseudo R2 0.3217  
 
Notes: home is an indicator for students being from the state and college is an indicator for students attending college in 
the state.  apply is an indicator for students applying to a college in the state.  {SAT low}, {SAT middle}, and {SAT 
high} indicate SAT scores in the lowest quintile, any of the middle three quintiles, and the highest quintile, 
respectively.  {public} and {private} indicate that the student attended a public or private university.  The sample size, 
12,781, is smaller than in Appendix Table 2 because only students that applied to institutions in more than one state are 
included. 
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Appendix Table 4: 
Institutions in the HERI Dataset Used in Our Study 
 
First Sample 
 
Public Universities Private Universities Private Colleges 
 
Georgia Institute of Technology Carnegie Mellon University Babson College 
Iowa State University Duke University Bard College 
Miami University (Ohio) Emory University Barnard College 
University of Massachusetts (Amherst) Johns Hopkins University Bates College 
University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) Northwestern University Beloit College 
University of Minnesota (Twin Cities) Rice University Bowdoin College 
University of Pittsburgh Stanford University Bryn Mawr College 
University of Vermont University of Rochester Bucknell University 
University of Virginia Vanderbilt University Carleton College 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State U  Claremont McKenna College 
  Colby College 
  Connecticut College 
  Grinnell College 
  Harvey Mudd College 
  Haverford College 
  Macalester College 
  Middlebury College 
  Reed College 
  Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology 
  Scripps College 
  Stevens Institute of Technology 
  Trinity College 
  University of Richmond 
  Washington and Lee University 
  Wellesley College 
  Wesleyan University 
  Wheaton College 
  Whitman College 
  Williams College 
  Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
 
 
Additional Institutions in the Second Sample 
 
Public Universities Private Universities Private Colleges 
 
Ohio State University Boston College Allegheny College 
Purdue University (Indiana) Clarkson University Bentley College 
University of Alabama Cornell University Berry College 
University of Arkansas (Fayetteville) New York University Bethany College 
Utah State University Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Centre College 
 Santa Clara University Chapman University 
 Tulane University Clark University 
 University of San Diego Coe College 
 University of Southern California Elizabethtown College 
 Villanova University Furman University 
 Wake Forest University Gettysburg College 
 Washington University Goucher College 
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  Hamilton College 
  Hiram College 
  Hobart and William Smith Colleges 
  Hollins University 
  Illinois Wesleyan University 
  John Brown University 
  Juniata College 
  Kettering University 
  Knox College 
  Lafayette College 
  Milwaukee School of Engineering 
  Oklahoma Christian University 
  Pacific University 
  Pepperdine University 
  Pitzer College 
  Rochester Institute of Technology 
  Rollins College 
  Saint Lawrence University 
  Siena College 
  Ursinus College 
  Wabash College 
  Willamette University 
 
 
 
 
